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UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME: IS THERE A CASE FOR INDIA?

In a post-budget interview on February 1, 2017, the government of India’s minister of finance and corporate affairs, Arun Jaitley, said,

I think the Universal Basic Income is a wonderful idea . . . Arvind Subramanian [chief economic adviser] has put it as Gandhi’s conversation that the poorest must have some income. If you take all the subsidies that the State is giving—the LPG [liquefied petroleum gas] subsidy, the kerosene subsidy, the railways subsidy, fertilizer subsidy—add all these subsidies and instead of a subsidy give the poor a basic income cheque.

Jaitley was referring to the idea of universal basic income (UBI), which had captured an entire chapter in the

*Economic Survey 2016–17*, the flagship annual document of the Indian’s government’s Ministry of Finance.

Expectations were high that the budget, which would soon follow the release of the survey, would propose a UBI scheme for the country; but these hopes remained unfulfilled, as the budget made no mention of any UBI proposal.

However, the very fact that the minister of finance lauded and endorsed the concept of UBI as a social welfare goal ensured that the notion remained alive in public and policy discourses. Any UBI proposal for a country as populous and diverse as India, which boasted an extensive and complex existing social welfare system, needed to be thoroughly evaluated from several perspectives. Was this the right time for introducing a UBI in India? How could a UBI be operationalized in India, and what were the key obstacles that would most likely be encountered? How would the UBI be calculated, and what would its scope be? Was UBI fiscally feasible for India? What fiscal and policy readjustments would the government need to make to implement UBI?

These onerous decisions Jaitley was confronting had no ready answers and required detailed deliberations and consultations with the Union Council of Ministers; the National Institution for Transforming India (NITI) Aayog, a policy think tank of the government of India; and the chief economic adviser, who had proposed the UBI in the *Economic Survey 2016–17*. Jaitley had convened a special meeting of the Union Cabinet and initiated a series of round tables with NITI Aayog and a few public policy experts in the country. He would have to prepare for a discussion with the prime minister the following week.

**UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

While the idea of a UBI had its origins in the beginning of the sixteenth century, the concept had more recently witnessed a revival of sorts, with governments and policy-makers the world over seriously considering it as a policy option (see Exhibit 1). Underlying trends driving the move toward UBI globally included ever-increasing inequalities of income and wealth; increasing polarization in societies; the digital and automation wave that threatened livelihoods; the problem of a rapidly aging population in the developed world; and a developing world that continued to grapple with poverty, as the marginalized sections struggled to get to a basic minimum living standard.

Basic Income Earth Network defined UBI as “a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means-test or work requirement.” UBI had been considered a promising model for sustainably eliminating poverty. The most compelling argument in favour of UBI was its capability to redistribute income to achieve social justice by guaranteeing a decent minimum income to all citizens. UBI was mainly recommended as an alternative to existing welfare schemes, which were characterized by leakage, wastage, and corruption. Unconditional UBI through cash transfer gave recipients the freedom to spend their income on what they considered priorities. UBI believed in the component of agency, wherein recipients were treated as agents who could make decisions for themselves, unlike the in- kind welfare schemes, which treated recipients as subjects who could not make economic decisions relevant to their lives. Since the basic income was universal in nature, administrative authorities were saved from the challenging task of identifying the target groups and creating huge administrative machinery for distributing the welfare benefits to the targeted population. In countries with efficient technology and financial infrastructure, implementation of UBI would reduce administrative costs and prevent leakages.

A prerequisite for UBI payments was for beneficiaries to open bank accounts in their name. The creation of a large number of bank accounts would accelerate the process of financial inclusion in countries adopting UBI. UBI also had substantial implications in the labour market; the provision of basic income to ensure a minimum standard of living would free workers from being hostages to necessity. This would help to reduce exploitative labour market practices and provide more flexibility to workers to choose productive and meaningful employment opportunities. This argument was more relevant in the era of automation and shrinking job opportunities. UBI was also expected to have a positive impact on economic growth. According to a study published by the Roosevelt Institute in 2017, the provision of US$12,000 per year per adult in the United States was expected to increase economic growth in the range of 12.56 to 13.10 per cent over a period of eight years.

Varied operational versions of UBI were in existence across several countries, either in proposal or in pilot form. The US state of Alaska best illustrated the concept of a pure UBI in the world, as all of Alaska’s official residents had received a uniform and unconditional dividend every year since 1982. Many countries across the world had seen the concept of a UBI enter into the policy arena. Countries such as Finland, Spain, the Netherlands, and Canada had experimented with UBI through pilots or focused experiments. The widely acclaimed and pioneering government-backed Finnish pilot on basic income, launched in 2017, involved giving a regular unconditional monthly stipend to 2,000 unemployed residents. The recipients, who were required to forgo certain other benefits, reported positive outcomes in terms of their overall well-being and happiness. However, the scope of the experiment was small, and its impact on work ethic remained inconclusive. Initial findings of Canada’s basic income experiment launched in three counties of Ontario in 2017 suggested that recipients saw improvements in physical and mental health, with some seeing a significant enhancement in their living standards, food security, and financial stability. Several recipients also reported moving to more secure and better-paying jobs while receiving the payouts.

Though there were many advantages to UBI, one of the main arguments against it was that it reduced peoples’ incentive to work. This argument assumed that the provision of basic income created a moral- hazard problem that would lead to a reduction in labour supply. Supporters of this proposition argued that once the yoke of necessity was removed through the provision of UBI, people might become lazy and opt out of the labour market. But the supporters of UBI stated that UBI only offered the basic minimum income and therefore should not act as a disincentive to work. Another concern about UBI was that recipients could spend the money on temptation goods like tobacco and alcohol.

**UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME READINESS AND THE INDIAN ECONOMY**

UBI was considered as an alternative to public welfare schemes and subsidies, which were aimed at reducing poverty.

As per a 2016 report from the World Bank, India was home to the largest number of people who were living below the international poverty line ($1.90 per person per day).Though India had made substantial progress in poverty reduction (see Exhibit 2), the country still accounted for one-third of poverty-stricken people in the world. India’s poverty head-count ratio at the national poverty line was 21.9 per cent. Though poverty had shown a declining trend over the years, a substantial number of people were still below the poverty line, and rural areas accounted for a greater number of poor people compared to urban areas (see Exhibit 2). In fact, according to the World Bank, 80 per cent of India’s poor lived in rural areas. Rural India had almost double the proportion of people below the poverty line (25.7 per cent) when compared to urban India (13.7 per cent).

The Indian states had extreme disparities when it came to poverty levels and the number of poor they housed. The seven low-income states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Rajasthan were home to 62 per cent of the country’s poor. Another disconcerting facet of India’s poverty was its caste-wise distribution. While the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes constituted about 28 per cent of the population, they made up a significant 43 per cent of the country’s poor. The incidence of poverty was highest among the scheduled tribes

While economic liberalization and globalization had strongly supported economic growth since the 1990s, overall inequalities of income and wealth had sadly worsened in the same period. This was captured by the deterioration of the Gini index for India (see Exhibit 3).

Since India followed a socialistic system of governance, subsidies and various social welfare schemes played a major role in India’s poverty alleviation efforts throughout the post-independence era. For the past three years, subsidies as a percentage of government expenditure were about 12 per cent (see Exhibit 4). Further analysis of the composition of subsidies revealed that food and fertilizer subsidies were responsible for more than 75 per cent of the total expenditure on subsidies (see Exhibit 4). Though the share of petroleum subsidies was higher between 2010 and 2014, there had been a substantial reduction in the subsidies given to petroleum products. This was mainly due to the complete deregulation of petrol and diesel prices and the partial deregulation of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) subsidies.

Though subsidies and welfare schemes were expected to improve the standard of living of those who lived in poverty, targeting and distribution errors reduced the efficacy of these initiatives. In the discussion of UBI in the *Economic Survey 2016–17*, the exclusion errors were estimated for some of the largest welfare schemes in the country, representing the share of the targeted group not receiving the benefits. According to the survey, for the period 2011–12 the exclusion error was 40 per cent for India’s Public Distribution

System (PDS) and 65 per cent for the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme (see Exhibit 5). Acute misallocation was also evident in the fact that the allocation of funds in 2015–16 to backward districts that accounted for 40 per cent of individuals who lived in poverty was much less than 40 per cent of the total resources.

The welfare system in India was overburdened by a huge number of schemes and subsidies therein; this was amply illustrated by the *Economic Survey 2016–17*. There were about 950 central and centrally sponsored schemes accounting for 5.2 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). There was a large number of small schemes, while the top 11 schemes accounted for 50 per cent of total budgetary allocation. The complex myriad of schemes was difficult to administer, and the greater the number of schemes, the higher the likelihood that resources would be misallocated.

UBI could tackle issues related to misallocation, as UBI was a simple transfer of money that went directly into beneficiaries’ bank accounts. This process required huge investment in financial and technical infrastructure in India. Thankfully, efforts to create this infrastructure had already been initiated by the Manmohan Singh government for launching the Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) scheme in 2013. In direct cash transfer schemes, government subsidies were directly credited to the bank accounts of the beneficiaries as cash transfers using a biometric-based identification system. The program promised to transform service delivery in India by transferring government benefits and subsidies, speeding up payments, removing leakages, and enhancing financial inclusion. By February 2015, the government had brought all central sector schemes and centrally sponsored schemes under the direct cash transfer system. The National Democratic Alliance government that took office in 2014 continued these efforts, and India made substantial progress in implementing the Jan Dhan–Aadhaar–Mobile (JAM) trinity.

Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana was launched in September 2014 to accelerate the process of financial inclusion in the country by opening “Jan Dhan” accounts for people who did not have a bank account. This program aimed at improving the provision of financial services to disadvantaged and low-income groups. By March 2018, 314.4 million Jan Dhan accounts had been opened (see Exhibit 6). According to the Global Findex report published by the World Bank, 80 per cent of adult Indians had a bank account in 2017 compared to 35 per cent in 2011. Despite having made substantial progress in bank account ownership, India still had the second-largest unbanked population in the world after China. At present, there were about 190 million adult Indians without a bank account.

Another government initiative was in the form of Aadhaar, a unique identification number that contained an Indian citizen’s biometric and demographic information. As of December 2017, 77.5 per cent of current accounts and savings accounts were seeded with Aadhaar. Out of the 307.6 million Jan Dhan accounts, 73.4 per cent were linked to Aadhaar. Substantial progress had been made in terms of both the number of beneficiaries added under the DBT schemes and the amount that had been transferred to the beneficiaries (see Exhibit 7). According to the DBT authorities, as of March 2018, ₹900 billion had been saved due to the direct cash transfers related to various government subsidies and welfare schemes. These savings were mainly due to the elimination of duplicate, fake, non-existent, or ineligible beneficiaries enrolled for various subsidy and welfare schemes.

The third aspect of JAM pertained to mobile phone use. India’s mobile infrastructure had been growing. In 2017, India was the second-largest mobile phone and smartphone market in the world after China. Mobile phone subscriptions and teledensity had improved substantially (see Exhibit 8). According to a report from the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, there were more than 1 billion mobile phone subscribers in India, with an overall teledensity of 90.11 per cent as of December 2017. The major concern was the slow growth in rural teledensity, which was 56.28 per cent in 2017. Internet access was another prerequisite

for realizing the Digital India objective. The Digital India plan was launched by the government in 2015 with the objective of making government services available to citizens electronically by improving online infrastructure and Internet connectivity. A major challenge while realizing the Digital India plan was the low Internet penetration rate in India, which was about 35 per cent, with an urban penetration rate of 65 per cent and a rural penetration rate of 20.26 per cent.

The remarkable progress made in improving the JAM infrastructure helped the country to earn huge gains through large-scale implementation of DBT (see Exhibit 9). These gains were mainly due to the removal of duplicate, fake, non-existent, or ineligible beneficiaries. A well-established technical and financial infrastructure would potentially make it easier for the government to implement UBI without incurring significant implementation costs.

Experts had calculated differing levels of UBI feasible for India (see Exhibit 10). Almost all experts had recommended the rollback of certain existing schemes in India’s current social welfare system. The suggested levels of UBI ranged widely, from ₹3,500 to ₹13,000, and the cost as a percentage of GDP ranged from 3.5 to 12 per cent. While universality was incorporated by most experts in their calculations, Vijay Joshi and Reetika Khera outlined quasi-universal scenarios, presumably due to cost considerations.

The *Economic Survey 2016–17* comprehensively calculated various levels of UBI associated with differing poverty rates (see Exhibit 11). It targeted an eventual poverty rate of 0.45 per cent, as the cost of going from a low level of poverty to totally eliminating it was prohibitively high. UBI was then calculated as the income needed to take an individual below the poverty line to above the threshold level of ₹893 per month (the poverty line for 2011–12). This amounted to ₹5,400 per year, and once this number was scaled up for inflation between 2011–12 and 2016–17, the UBI stood at ₹7,620 per person per year, with an associated cost of 6.2 per cent of the GDP. Citing reasons in favour of prudence and practicality, the survey targeted a quasi-universal rate of 75 per cent of the population, and the cost of implementing a quasi-universal UBI fell to 4.9 per cent of the GDP.

The fiscal implication of UBI had to be measured accurately to assess the feasibility of UBI implementation in India. Fiscal deficit was the best indicator to assess the financial prudence of the government. In order to induce fiscal discipline in government expenditure, the *Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act*, 2003, was brought in with the objective of limiting fiscal deficit to 3 per cent of the GDP. Considering the five years of data from 2014 to 2019 (see Exhibit 12), fiscal deficit had been in the range of 3.4 to 4.1 per cent. This indicated that the government needed to be more fiscally disciplined when finalizing expenditure components. Fiscal discipline required an ideal balance between the revenues and expenditures of the government. In order to achieve this balance the government needed to streamline its expenditures. This streamlining would give less room for the government to substantially increase its expenditure to implement a full-fledged UBI. Targeting a quasi-basic income transfer, funded by removing some components in the existing welfare expenditure, could be a feasible way out. Any effort to retain all of the existing welfare programs and then to allocate fresh funds for UBI could lead to a situation of fiscal slippage.

India had two successful pilots for UBI initiatives—one in Madhya Pradesh, the other in Delhi. In partnership with the Government of Delhi, and with help from the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), the United Nations Development Programme carried out a randomized controlled trial replacing food subsidized through the PDS with unconditional cash transfers to 100 households below the poverty line during January–December 2011. The randomly selected 100 households in New Delhi (out of a total of 450 households that were part of the experiment) received ₹1,000 per month, which was deposited into bank accounts opened in the name of the female head of participating households. The results showed no reduction in per-capita calorie consumption, and wasteful spending (e.g., the purchase of alcohol or non- food items) was not encouraged. Moreover, expenditures on nutritious non-cereal items such as pulses, fish, eggs, and meat increased.

In Madhya Pradesh, SEWA and the United Nations Children’s Fund jointly conducted two larger-scale pilots from June 2011 to November 2012, in which about 6,000 people, including men, women, and children, in eight villages of the state were provided an unconditional, universal, and individual grant every month. This payout was approximately 25 per cent of the median income families’ monthly earnings. The first pilot consisted of every adult and child in eight villages receiving ₹200 and ₹100, respectively. These amounts were revised upward to ₹300 and ₹150, respectively, to account for inflation. This initiative lasted 17 months. The outcome from these villages was compared to that of 12 similar control villages that received no payout. Similarly, in the second pilot, every adult and child in a tribal village received ₹300 and ₹150 each month, respectively, for a year, while another tribal village acted as a control for comparison. The project had an incredible impact in terms of raising living standards as well as the quality of life in the pilot villages. Notable improvements were observed in access to better drinking water; the purchase of assets; food security; and children’s nutrition and education, especially in terms of schooling for girls.

However, these experiments never took shape for the entire country. The challenges were in the prerequisites. Problems were bound to arise while scaling up randomized controlled trials. First of all, there would be direct and indirect economic impacts on fiscal feasibility, regional economic activity, and inflation. Whereas participants might have behaved in a particular way while being a part of an experiment, they might otherwise have acted differently, resulting in different outcomes. Also, questions were raised about how effectively the pilot outcomesrestricted to small groups of homogeneous populationscould be more widely generalized to program implementation in the real world. In a country as diverse as India, larger pilots covering bigger geographical areas and populations were likely needed.

**DESIGNING A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME FOR INDIA: THE DREAM AND THE DILEMMA**

Any UBI design had to balance the contradictions between universality, fiscal capability, the difficulties in managing existing programs, and the state capacity to implement UBI. For a country like India, providing UBI and eradicating poverty was an aspirational dream, but the challenges that needed to be tackled made it an arduous path. Could the dilemmas be overcome to achieve the dream? Was a UBI even possible for a country like India?

A large number of welfare schemes were already being administered through DBT, so it was possible that there was no need for a UBI at present. However, another possibility would be to implement a moderate UBI and to continue welfare schemes with better targeting. A third option alternative would be to follow a quasi-UBI approach. Jaitley would need to consider these options. He would have to make an appointment with Narendra Modi, the prime minister of India, to discuss these ambitious ideas.

**EXHIBIT 1: EVOLUTION OF UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Thinker/Activist** | **Basic Income Proposal** |
| Thomas Moore, Juan Luis Vives March (16th century) | Moore proposed an assistance program to deal with theft. Vives felt that guaranteed minimum income was a responsibility of the municipal government. Vives inspired England’s Poor Laws (1576 onwards) as well as a scheme put into place by the  Flemish municipality of Ypres. |
| Marquis of Condorcet, Thomas Paine (late 18th century) | Condorcet’s social insurance system was described by EnglishAmerican political activist Thomas Paine as a system in which payments should be made “to every person, rich or poor,”\* from a community fund to which every landholder contributed rent. This  sowed the seeds of the development of Europe’s social insurance systems in 1883. |
| William Cobbett, Samuel Read, George Julius Poulett Scrope, Charles Fourier, Joseph Charlier, John Stuart Mill (19th  century) | An extension of Paine’s arguments. Compensation for the loss of direct access to natural resources, especially land. Mill defined a non-means-tested basic income, a true form of UBI: “In the distribution, a certain minimum is first assigned for the subsistence of every member of the community, whether capable or not of labour. The remainder of the produce is shared in certain proportions, to be determined  beforehand, among the three elements, Labour, Capital, and Talent.”\*\* |
| Basic income ideas in the 20th century | United Kingdom, interwar period (1918–1944): Bertrand Russel’s UBI as “sufficient for necessaries.”\*\*\* Dennis Milner’s unconditional “state bonus,”\*\*\*\* paid weekly.  Major Douglas’s “national dividend,” a monthly payment to all households. |
| United States in the 1960s: Robert Theobald’s triple revolutions—the cybernation revolution, the weaponry revolution, and the human rights revolution—as a plea for a basic income. Milton Friedman’s negative income tax, payable to persons below the tax threshold. John Kenneth Galbraith, James Tobin, Joseph Pechman, and Peter Miezkowski’s proposal of a “demogrant” to households. President Nixon’s  proposed Family Assistance Plan was based on these ideas and eventually rejected. |
| Northwestern Europe in the 1970s and 80s: Denmark’s proposed “citizen’s wage” in 1978. The Netherlands’ “guaranteed income” proposal (J. P. Kuiper, 1976). A small radical party in the Netherlands became the first European political party to officially incorporate UBI in its electoral program. The prestigious Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy recommended a “partial basic income,” though it was  not meant to replace the conditional minimum income system in place. |

Note: UBI = universal basic income.

Source: \*John E. King and John Marangos. “Two Arguments for Basic Income: Thomas Paine (1737-1809) and Thomas Spence (1750-1814),” *History of Economic Ideas* (2006): 5571; \*\*John S. Mill, “Principles of Political Economy, 1848, reprint, New York, NY: Augustus M,” (1987); \*\*\*Bertrand Russell, *Roads to Freedom. Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism*, (London, UK: Unwin Books. 1918); \*\*\*\*E. Mabel Milner and Dennis Milner, *Scheme for a State Bonus: A Rational Method of Solving the Social Problem* (North of England Newspaper Company, 1918); “History of Basic Income,” Basic Income Earth Network, accessed May 26, 2018, https://basicincome.org/basic-income/history/.

**EXHIBIT 2: POVERTY ESTIMATES IN INDIA BASED ON NATIONAL POVERTY LINE**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **Head-Count Ratio, National** | **Head-Count Ratio, Rural** | **Head-Count Ratio,**  **Urban** | **Millions of Poor,**  **National** | **Millions of Poor,**  **Rural** | **Millions of Poor, Urban** |
| 2011 | 21.9 | 25.7 | 13.7 | 269.8 | 216.7 | 53.1 |
| 2009 | 29.8 | 33.8 | 20.9 | 354.7 | 278.2 | 76.5 |
| 2004 | 37.2 | 41.8 | 25.7 | 407.1 | 326.3 | 80.8 |
| 1993 | 45.3 | 50.1 | 31.8 | 403.7 | 328.6 | 74.5 |
| 1987 | 39.3 | 39.1 | 40.1 | 312.7 | 229.4 | 83.3 |
| 1983 | 44.8 | 45.6 | 42.2 | 327.0 | 251.7 | 75.3 |
| 1977 | 51.8 | 53.1 | 47.4 | 332.0 | 264.3 | 67.7 |
| 1973 | 54.9 | 56.4 | 49.2 | 321.6 | 261.3 | 60.3 |

Note: Poverty estimates from 1973 to 1987 are based on the methodology used by the Planning Commission expert group; estimates from 1993 to 2011 are based on methodology developed by S. D. Tendulkar.

Source: “Table 154: Number and Percentage of Population below Poverty Line,” Reserve Bank of India, September 15, 2019, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=19145.](http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=19145)

**EXHIBIT 3: GINI INDEX TREND FOR INDIA**



**India GINI Index**

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

**48.2**

**35.6 35**

**33.1**

**31.1 30.4**

**29.2**

**32.1 31.5 32.2**

**29.7**

**32.5 32**

**31.7**

**36.8 35.15**

1951 1955 1961 1965 1970 1974 1977 1983 1986 1990 1991 1992 1999 2005 2010 2012

**Time Period**

Source: World Income Inequality Database (WIID), United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, December 2018, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.wider.unu.edu/project/wiid-world-income-inequality-database.](http://www.wider.unu.edu/project/wiid-world-income-inequality-database)



**GINI Index**

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|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **Food Subsidy** | **Food Subsidy as % of Total Subsidy** | **Fertilizer Subsidy** | **Fertilizer Subsidy as % of Total Subsidy** | **Petroleum Subsidy** | **Petroleum Subsidy as**  **% of Total Subsidy** |
| 201718 | 1,002,816.9 | 44.68 | 664,675.7 | 29.61 | 244,604.9 | 10.90 |
| 201617 | 1,101,729.6 | 46.92 | 663,129.3 | 28.24 | 275,387.1 | 11.73 |
| 201516 | 1,394,190.0 | 52.79 | 724,151.7 | 27.42 | 299,990.0 | 11.36 |
| 201415 | 1,176,711.6 | 45.56 | 710,756.2 | 27.52 | 602,688.2 | 23.34 |
| 201314 | 920,000.0 | 36.13 | 673,387.7 | 26.45 | 853,781.6 | 33.53 |
| 201213 | 850,000.0 | 33.06 | 656,130.0 | 25.52 | 968,800.0 | 37.68 |
| 201112 | 728,220.0 | 33.41 | 700,130.0 | 32.12 | 684,840.0 | 31.42 |
| 201011 | 638,440.0 | 36.81 | 623,010.0 | 35.93 | 383,710.0 | 22.13 |
| 200910 | 584,430.0 | 41.35 | 612,640.0 | 43.34 | 149,510.0 | 10.58 |
| 200809 | 437,510.0 | 33.73 | 766,030.0 | 59.06 | 28,520.0 | 2.20 |
| 200708 | 313,280.0 | 44.17 | 324,900.0 | 45.81 | 28,200.0 | 3.98 |
| 200607 | 240,140.0 | 42.04 | 262,220.0 | 45.90 | 26,990.0 | 4.72 |
| 200506 | 230,770.0 | 48.56 | 184,600.0 | 38.85 | 26,830.0 | 5.65 |
| 200405 | 25,7980.0 | 56.14 | 158,790.0 | 34.55 | 29,560.0 | 6.43 |
| 200304 | 251,810.0 | 56.81 | 118,470.0 | 26.73 | 63,510.0 | 14.33 |
| 200203 | 241,760.0 | 55.53 | 110,150.0 | 25.30 | 52,250.0 | 12.00 |

**EXHIBIT 4 (CONTINUED)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Interest Subsidies | Interest Subsidies as  % of Total Subsidy | Other Subsidies | Other Subsidies as  % of Total Subsidy | Total Subsidies | Total Government Expenditure | Total Subsides as Percentage of  Government Expenditure |
| 201718 | 221,463.7 | 9.87 | 110,990.3 | 4.94 | 2,244,551.5 | 21,419,730 | 10.48 |
| 201617 | 178,884.0 | 7.62 | 128,957.0 | 5.49 | 2,348,087.0 | 19,751,940 | 11.89 |
| 201516 | 167,298.4 | 6.33 | 55,424.9 | 2.10 | 2,641,055.0 | 17,907,830 | 14.75 |
| 201415 | 76,322.8 | 2.96 | 16,100.1 | 0.62 | 2,582,578.9 | 16,636,730 | 15.52 |
| 201314 | 81,371.9 | 3.20 | 17,777.2 | 0.70 | 2,546,318.4 | 15,594,470 | 16.33 |
| 201213 | 72,700.0 | 2.83 | 23,160.0 | 0.90 | 2,570,790.0 | 14,103,720 | 18.23 |
| 201112 | 50,490.0 | 2.32 | 15,728.7 | 0.72 | 2,179,408.7 | 13,043,650 | 16.71 |
| 201011 | 46,800.0 | 2.70 | 42,230.6 | 2.44 | 1,734,190.6 | 11,973,280 | 14.48 |
| 200910 | 26,860.0 | 1.90 | 40,060.0 | 2.83 | 1,413,500.0 | 10,244,870 | 13.80 |
| 200809 | 34,930.0 | 2.69 | 30,090.0 | 2.32 | 1,297,080.0 | 8,839,560 | 14.67 |
| 200708 | 23,110.0 | 3.26 | 19,770.0 | 2.79 | 709,260.0 | 7,126,710 | 9.95 |
| 200607 | 28,090.0 | 4.92 | 13,810.0 | 2.42 | 571,250.0 | 5,833,870 | 9.79 |
| 200506 | 21,770.0 | 4.58 | 11,250.0 | 2.37 | 475,220.0 | 5,057,380 | 9.40 |
| 200405 | 5,640.0 | 1.23 | 7,600.0 | 1.65 | 459,570.0 | 4,982,520 | 9.22 |
| 200304 | 1,700.0 | 0.38 | 7,740.0 | 1.75 | 443,230.0 | 4,712,030 | 9.41 |
| 200203 | 7,500.0 | 1.72 | 23,670.0 | 5.44 | 435,330.0 | 4,132,480 | 10.53 |

Source: Compiled by the authors from Planning Commission of India, “Details of Subsidies,” 200203 to 200708, accessed April 15 2017, https://niti.gov.in/planningcommission.gov.in/docs/data/datatable/data\_2312/DatabookDec2014%2035.pdf; Government of India, “Expenditure Budget,” 200809, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget\_archive/ub2010-11/eb/stat04.pdf;](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget_archive/ub2010-11/eb/stat04.pdf%3B) Government of India, “Expenditure Budget,” 200910, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2011-2012/ub2011-12/eb/stat04.pdf;](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2011-2012/ub2011-12/eb/stat04.pdf%3B) Government of India, “Expenditure Budget,” 201011, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2012-2013/ub2012-](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2012-2013/ub2012-) 13/eb/stat04.pdf; Government of India, “Expenditure Budget,” 201112, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2013-2014/ub2013-14/eb/stat04.pdf;](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2013-2014/ub2013-14/eb/stat04.pdf%3B) Government of India, “Expenditure Budget,” 201213, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2014-2015/ub2014-15/eb/stat04.pdf;](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2014-2015/ub2014-15/eb/stat04.pdf%3B) Government of India, “Expenditure Budget,” 201314, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2015-2016/ub2015-](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2015-2016/ub2015-) 16/eb/stat04.pdf; Government of India, “Expenditure Budget,” 201415, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2016-2017/ub2016-17/eb/stat04.pdf;](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2016-2017/ub2016-17/eb/stat04.pdf%3B) Government of India, “Expenditure Budget,” 201516, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/ub2017-18/eb/stat7.pdf;](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/ub2017-18/eb/stat7.pdf%3B) Government of India, “Expenditure Budget,” 201617, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2018-2019/ub2018-19/eb/stat7.pdf;](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2018-2019/ub2018-19/eb/stat7.pdf%3B) Government of India, “Expenditure Budget,” 201718, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2019-](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2019-) 20/expenditure\_profile.php.

**EXHIBIT 5: TARGETING EFFICIENCY IN CENTRAL SCHEMES (% OF TOTAL ALLOCATION)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Inefficiency** | **PDS** | **NREGS** |
| Out-of-System Leakage | 36 | 20 |
| Benefits Accruing to Non-poor (Inclusion Error) | 36 | 43 |
| Received by Bottom 40% | 28 | 37 |
| Total | 100 | 100 |
| Share of Targeted Group Not Getting Benefits (Exclusion Error) | 40 | 65 |

Note: PDS = Public Distribution System; NREGS = National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme.

Source: Economic Division, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, ch. 9, “Universal Basic Income: A Conversation With and Within the Mahatma,” in *Economic Survey 2016–2017*, January 2017, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/index.asp.](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/index.asp)

**EXHIBIT 6: GROWTH IN JAN DHAN ACCOUNTS (CUMULATIVE)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **No. of Accounts (Million)** | **Balance in the Account (**₹ **Million)** |
| 2017/18 | 314.4 | 784,940 |
| 2016/17 | 281.7 | 629,720 |
| 2015/16 | 214.3 | 356,720 |
| 2014/15 | 147.2 | 156,700 |

Source: Government of India, Department of Financial Services, *Financial Inclusion Report*, accessed April 20, 2020, https://financialservices.gov.in/sites/default/files/Financial%20Inclusion\_annual%20report\_material31.3.2019.pdf.

**EXHIBIT 7: GROWTH IN DIRECT BENEFIT TRANSFER SCHEME**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **Number of Schemes** | **Number of Beneficiaries (Million)** | **Amount Transferred (**₹ **Million)** |
| 2013/14 | 28 | 108 | 73,677 |
| 2014/15 | 34 | 228 | 389,231 |
| 2015/16 | 59 | 312 | 619,424 |
| 2016/17 | 142 | 357 | 746,894 |
| 2017/18 | 437 | 1,239 | 1,908,709 |

Source: Government of India, Direct Benefit Transfer, accessed April 17, 2020, https://dbtbharat.gov.in/.

**EXHIBIT 8: WIRELESS SUBSCRIPTION GROWTH**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **Wireless Subscriber Base**  **(Million)** | **Active Wireless Subscribers (Million)** | **Teledensity, Rural** | **Teledensity, Urban** | **Teledensity, Overall** |
| 2017 | 1,167.44 | 1,015.52 | 56.28 | 163.44 | 90.11 |
| 2016 | 1,127.37 | 988.14 | 52.84 | 165.04 | 88.00 |
| 2015 | 1,010.89 | 912.06 | 49.43 | 147.12 | 79.82 |
| 2014 | 943.97 | 833.02 | 45.47 | 142.46 | 75.43 |
| 2013 | 886.3 | 762.4 | 41.95 | 138.94 | 71.69 |
| 2012 | 864.72 | 701.6 | 39.04 | 143.48 | 70.82 |
| 2011 | 893.84 | 646.77 | 36.56 | 161.01 | 74.15 |
| 2010 | 752.19 | 529.22 | 30.11 | 140.53 | 63.22 |

Source: Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, “Press Release on Telecom Subscription Data,” Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, press release, 2017, accessed April 17, 2020, https://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PR\_No23\_TSD\_Eng\_16022018.pdf; Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, “Press Release on Telecom Subscription Data,” Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, press release, 2016, accessed April 17, 2020, https://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/Press\_Release\_11\_17\_Feb\_2017\_Eng.pdf; Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, “Press Release on Telecom Subscription Data,” Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, press release, 2015, accessed April 17, 2020, https://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PR\_No\_15\_TSD\_December\_15.pdf; Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, “Press Release on Telecom Subscription Data,” Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, press release, 2014, accessed April 17, 2020, https://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PR-TSD-Dec-06\_02\_15.pdf; Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, “Press Release on Telecom Subscription Data,” Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, press release, 2013, accessed April 17, 2020, https://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PR-TSD-Dec\_17\_02\_14.pdf; Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, “Press Release on Telecom Subscription Data,” Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, press release, 2012, accessed April 17, 2020, https://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PR-TSD-Dec\_07\_02\_13.pdf; Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, “Press Release on Telecom Subscription Data,” Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, press release, 2011, accessed April 17, 2020, https://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PR-TSD-Nov\_09\_01\_12.pdf; Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, “Press Release on Telecom Subscription Data,” Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, press release, 2010, accessed April 17, 2020, https://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PR-TSD\_Dec\_09\_02\_11.pdf.

**EXHIBIT 9: ESTIMATED SAVINGS FOR DIRECT BENEFIT TRANSFER**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Time Period** | **Estimated Savings or Benefits (₹ Million)** |
| Cumulative up to March 2019 | 1,416,775.60 |
| Cumulative up to March 2018 | 900,127.10 |
| Cumulative up to March 2017 | 570,290.00 |
| Cumulative up to March 2016 | 361,440.00 |

Source: “Estimated Gains,” Direct Benefit Transfer, Government of India, accessed April 17, 2020, https://dbtbharat.gov.in/page/frontcontentview/?id=ODM=.

**EXHIBIT 10: UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME IN INDIA, RECOMMENDATIONS BY EXPERTS**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Expert** | **Universal or Quasi- Universal?** | **Amount of UBI Proposed (Annual) (₹)** | **Cost as a % of GDP** | **Financing Mechanism** |
| Pranab Bardhan (2016) | Yes. | 10,000 | 10% | Rollback of “non-merit” subsidies and elimination of corporate tax holidays and exemptions. |
| Vijay Joshi (2016) | Yes, though non- universal scenarios also suggested. | 3,500 | 3.5%  (alternatively, 2.5% if paid to  67%, and 1.9% if paid to 50% of the population) | Rollback “non-merit” and food subsidies, eliminating tax exemptions, privatization of public sector enterprises, taxing agricultural incomes and doing away with dysfunctional social welfare schemes. |
| Maitreesh Ghatak (2016) | Yes. | 13,432 | 11% | Eliminating subsidies going to the non-poor and additional taxes. |
| Debraj Ray (2016) | Yes. | 10,000–13,000 | 9%–12% | A fixed proportion of GDP to be committed. |
| Abhijit Banerjee  (2016) | Yes. | 13,000 | 11% | Welfare schemes like the PDS and MGNREGA to be replaced. |
|  | All elderly, widows, |  |  |  |
|  | disabled persons | 12,000 |  |
|  | (approximately 10% | (pensions) |  |
| Reetika | of the population), |  |  |
| Khera | and pregnant | 6,000 | 1.5% |
| (2016) | women | (per child |  |
|  | (approximately 26 | maternity |  |
|  | million children born | entitlements) |  |
|  | annually). |  |  |
| *Economic* | Bottom 75% of income distribution. |  |  | Rollback social sector |
| *Survey*  *2016–17* | 7,620 | 4.9% | programs, elimination of implicit middle-class  Subsidies and rationalization of top 10 |
| (2017) |  |  | centrally sponsored schemes |
| IMF (2017) | Yes. | 2,600  (per person, 2011–12 prices) | 2.81% | Elimination of food and energy subsidies. |

Note: UBI = universal basic income; INR = Indian rupee; GDP = gross domestic product; IMF = International Monetary Fund; PDS = Public Distribution System; MGNREGA = Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act.

Source: Ugo Gentilini et al., *Exploring Universal Basic Income: A Guide to Navigating Concepts, Evidence, and Practices* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2020), 274–277, accessed March 11, 2020, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/993911574784667955/pdf/Exploring-Universal-Basic-Income-A-Guide-to-> Navigating-Concepts-Evidence-and-Practices.pdf.

**EXHIBIT 11: COST AND IMPACT OF VARYING LEVELS OF UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME ON POVERTY LEVELS (ESTIMATES)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **UBI** | **UBI** | **Poverty** |  | **Fiscal Cost as**  **% of GDP (2016-17) NSS** | **Fiscal Cost as %** |
| **(₹ per** | **(₹ per** | **Rate** | **Poverty Rate** | **of GDP (De Facto** |
| **Capita** | **Capita** | **(2011–12)** | **(2011–12)** | **Universality, excluding** |
| **per Year,** | **per Year,** | **NSS (%)** | **IHDS (%)** | **Top 25%, 2016–17)** |
| **2011–12)** | **2016–17)** |  |  | **NSS** |
| 0 | 0 | 22.03 | 16.86 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 600 | 874 | 17.62 | 13.93 | 0.7 | 0.6 |
| 1,200 | 1,747 | 13.54 | 11.51 | 1.5 | 1.1 |
| 1,800 | 2,496 | 9.78 | 9.02 | 2.1 | 1.6 |
| 2,400 | 3,370 | 6.63 | 6.94 | 2.9 | 2.1 |
| 3,000 | 4,243 | 4.14 | 5.08 | 3.6 | 2.7 |
| 3,600 | 5,117 | 2.52 | 3.66 | 4.3 | 3.3 |
| 4,200 | 5,866 | 1.42 | 2.46 | 5.0 | 3.7 |
| 4,800 | 6,739 | 0.82 | 1.53 | 5.7 | 4.3 |
| 5,400 | 7,613 | 0.45 | 0.85 | 6.5 | 4.9 |
| 6,000 | 8,486 | 0.20 | 0.51 | 7.2 | 5.4 |
| 6,600 | 9,360 | 0.11 | 0.28 | 8.0 | 6.0 |
| 7,200 | 10,109 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 8.6 | 6.4 |
| 7,800 | 10,982 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 9.3 | 7.0 |
| 8,400 | 11,856 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 10.1 | 7.6 |
| 9,000 | 12,730 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 10.8 | 8.1 |
| 9,600 | 13,603 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 11.6 | 8.7 |
| 10,200 | 14.352 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 12.2 | 9.1 |
| 10,800 | 15,226 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 12.9 | 9.7 |
| 11,400 | 16,099 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 13.7 | 10.3 |
| 12,000 | 16,973 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 14.4 | 10.8 |

Note: UBI = universal basic income; NSS = National Sample Survey; IHDS = India Human Development Survey; GDP = gross domestic product.

Source: Economic Division, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, ch. 9, “Universal Basic Income: A Conversation With and Within the Mahatma,” in *Economic Survey 2016–2017*, January 2017, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/index.asp.](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/index.asp)

**EXHIBIT 12: INDIA’S FISCAL DEFICIT**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Year** | **Fiscal Deficit as % of GDP** |
| 2017/18 | 3.5 |
| 2016/17 | 3.5 |
| 2015/16 | 3.9 |
| 2014/15 | 4.1 |

Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

Source: Dipu Rai, “Budget 2020: Why Fiscal Deficit, Debt Are Set to Zoom Upward,” *India Today*, January 17, 2020, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiatoday.in/diu/story/budget-2020-why-fiscal-deficit-debt-are-set-to-zoom-upward-1637737-2020-01-17.](http://www.indiatoday.in/diu/story/budget-2020-why-fiscal-deficit-debt-are-set-to-zoom-upward-1637737-2020-01-17)

**ENDNOTES**

1 This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives presented in this case are not necessarily those of the Government of India or any of its employees; This case was awarded an honourable mention in the the ISB-Ivey Global Case Competition 2018. The prize was sponsored by ISB.

2 Shaswati Das, “Why Arun Jaitley Gave Universal Basic Income a Miss in Union Budget 2017,” Livemint, February 2, 2017, accessed March 6, 2020, https://[www.livemint.com/Politics/ns8z7JTxYLQc5AdGmlvtiN/Why-Jaitleys-Union-budget-didnt-](http://www.livemint.com/Politics/ns8z7JTxYLQc5AdGmlvtiN/Why-Jaitleys-Union-budget-didnt-) provide-for-universal-basi.html.

3 “Aayog” = Hindi for “Policy Commission.”

4 “History of Basic Income,” Basic Income Earth Network, accessed May 26, 2018, https://basicincome.org/basic- income/history/.

5 World Economic Forum, *The Global Risks Report 2017*, 12th ed. (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2017), 11, accessed May 26, 2018, www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17\_Report\_web.pdf.

6 Means-tested benefits or programs required beneficiaries to have income and/or capital below a specified level to be eligible for the benefits.

7 “About Basic Income,” Basic Income Earth Network, accessed May 26, 2018, https://basicincome.org/basic-income/.

8 In kind refers to welfare transfers in the form of good services or transaction which are not measured in monetary terms.

9 Economic Division, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, ch. 9, “Universal Basic Income: A Conversation With and Within the Mahatma,” in *Economic Survey 2016–2017*, January 2017, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/index.asp.](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/index.asp)

10 All dollar amounts are in US dollars.

11 Michalis Nikiforos, Marshall Steinbaum, and Gennaro Zezza, *Modeling the Macroeconomic Effects of a Universal Basic Income*, August 2017, accessed April 17, 2020, [http://rooseveltinstitute.org/modeling-macroeconomic-effects-ubi/.](http://rooseveltinstitute.org/modeling-macroeconomic-effects-ubi/)

12 Kate McFarland, “Alaska, US: Amount of 2016 Permanent Fund Dividend to Be $1022,” Basic Income Earth Network, September 29, 2016, accessed June 2, 2018, https://basicincome.org/news/2016/09/alaska-us-amount-2016-permanent- fund-dividend-1022/; Zachariah Hughes, “PFD Amount Announced: $1,100,” Alaska Public Media, September 15, 2017, accessed June 2, 2018, [www.alaskapublic.org/2017/09/15/pfd-amount-announced-1100/.](http://www.alaskapublic.org/2017/09/15/pfd-amount-announced-1100/)

13 Ugo Gentilini et al., *Exploring Universal Basic Income: A Guide to Navigating Concepts, Evidence, and Practices* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2020), 274–277, accessed March 11, 2020, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/993911574784667955/pdf/Exploring-Universal-Basic-Income-A-Guide-to-> Navigating-Concepts-Evidence-and-Practices.pdf.

14 Aria Bendix, “One of the World’s Largest Basic-Income Trials, a 2-Year Program in Finland, Was a Major Flop. But Experts Say the Test Was Flawed,” Business Insider India, December 8, 2019, accessed March 11, 2020, [www.businessinsider.in/finance/news/one-of-the-worlds-largest-basic-income-trials-a-2-year-program-in-finland-was-a-](http://www.businessinsider.in/finance/news/one-of-the-worlds-largest-basic-income-trials-a-2-year-program-in-finland-was-a-) major-flop-but-experts-say-the-test-was-flawed-/articleshow/72427400.cms.

15 Mohammad Ferdosi et al., *Southern Ontario’s Basic Income Experience*, March 2020, accessed March 11, 2020, https://labourstudies.mcmaster.ca/news/access-southern-ontario2019s-basic-income-experience-report.

16 Economic Division, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, op. cit.

17 Ibid.

18 David K. Evans and Anna Popova, Cash Transfers and Temptation Goods: A Review of Global Evidence (The World Bank, 2014), WPS6886, accessed June 30, 2020, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/18802/WPS6886.pdf.

19 The World Bank, *Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2018: Piecing Together the Poverty Puzzle* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2018), accessed May 25, 2018, [www.worldbank.org/en/publication/poverty-and-shared-prosperity.](http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/poverty-and-shared-prosperity)

20 “India,” Poverty & Equity Data Portal, The World Bank, accessed May 24, 2018, [http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/IND.](http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/IND)

21 Head-count ratio was the proportion of the population that lived below poverty line.

22 “Table 154: Number and Percentage of Population below Poverty Line,” Reserve Bank of India, September 15, 2019, accessed April 17, 2020, https://[www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=19145.](http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=19145)

23 “India’s Poverty Profile,” The World Bank, May 27, 2016, accessed December 9, 2018, [www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2016/05/27/india-s-poverty-profile.](http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2016/05/27/india-s-poverty-profile)

24 “Database on Indian Economy,” Reserve Bank of India, accessed December 9, 2018, https://dbie.rbi.org.in/DBIE/dbie.rbi?site=home.

25 “India’s Poverty Profile,” op. cit.

26 The central and state governments of India identified different categories of caste, such as scheduled castes (groups that were traditionally considered untouchable) and scheduled tribes (groups that resided in remote forests and were largely excluded from development), while other backward castes were materially deprived, relatively marginalized groups, identified at the state level. The government implemented various schemes for the socio-economic development of such groups.

27 “India’s Poverty Profile,” op. cit.

28 Ibid.

29 The Gini index measured the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households in an economy deviated from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 represented perfect equality, while an index of 100 implied perfect inequality.

30 Government of India Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, “Deregulation of Petroleum Prices,” Print Release, March 11, 2015, accessed May 26th 2018, [http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=116818.](http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=116818)

31 “Lpg-Policies and Guidelines,” Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, April 27, 2017, accessed May 26, 2018, [http://petroleum.nic.in/marketing/policies-and-guidelines/lpg-policies-and-guidelines.](http://petroleum.nic.in/marketing/policies-and-guidelines/lpg-policies-and-guidelines)

32 Exclusion error represented the number of people living below the poverty line who were being left out of receiving the benefits of the welfare program.

33 Economic Division, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, op. cit.

34 The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme was launched in 2005 in India to provide 100 days of guaranteed-wage employment for all employment seekers above 18 years of age who were willing to work.

35 Economic Division, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, op. cit.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Government of India, Direct Benefit Transfer, accessed April 17, 2020, https://dbtbharat.gov.in/page/frontcontentview/?id=MTc=.



39 The JAM trinity referred to the government of India’s initiative to link Jan Dhan accounts, mobile numbers, and Indians’ Aadhaar cards in order to plug the leakages of government subsidies. Aadhaar was a unique 12-digit identity number that could be obtained by residents of India and was based on residents’ biometric and demographic data.

40 Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana was a financial inclusion program to ensure affordable access to financial services such as banking, savings and deposit accounts, remittance, credit, insurance, and pensions. Account could be opened in any bank branch or business correspondent (Bank Mitra) outlet. See “Scheme Details,” Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY), accessed June 6, 2018, [www.pmjdy.gov.in/scheme.](http://www.pmjdy.gov.in/scheme)

41 “The Global Findex Database 2017,” The World Bank, accessed May 27, 2018, https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/.

42 Ibid.

43 PIB Delhi, “Linking of Jan Dhan Accounts with Aadhaar,” Ministry of Finance, December 29, 2017, accessed June 6, 2018, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1514653.

44 ₹ = INR = Indian rupee; US$1 = ₹67.4273 on February 1, 2017.

45 “Estimated Gains,” Direct Benefit Transfer, Government of India, accessed April 17, 2020, https://dbtbharat.gov.in/page/frontcontentview/?id=ODM=.

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47 Teledensity was the number of telephone connections for every 100 individuals living within an area.

48 The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India was a statutory body created by the government of India in 1997 to regulate the telecommunications sector in India.

49 Government of India, “Digital India,” accessed May 25, 2018, https://meity.gov.in/sites/upload\_files/dit/files/Digital%20India.pdf.

50 Specialized Technology Division, Kantar IMRB, *Internet in India 2017*, accessed April 17, 2020, https://cms.iamai.in/Content/ResearchPapers/15c3c84c-128a-4ea9-9cf2-a50a6d18f21c.pdf.

51 Saksham Khosla, *Universal Basic Income: Bedeviled by the Details* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018), accessed June 3, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP\_Khosla\_Report\_FNL\_w\_covers.pdf.

52 Quasi-UBI referred to basic income that was not universal in the strict sense, in that certain populations remained outside the coverage of UBI. Adopting a quasi-universal stance, Khera suggested a basic income for all elderly, widowed, and disabled persons as well as pregnant women, while Joshi outlined scenarios where the basic income was paid out to 67 per cent and 50 per cent of the population. Reetika Khera, “A Phased Approach Will Make a ‘Basic Income’ Affordable for India,” The Wire, December 20, 2016, accessed June 30, 2020, https://thewire.in/rights/basic-income-phased-approach; Vijay Joshi, “Universal Basic Income for India,” Ideas for India, October 21, 2016, accessed June 30, 2020, https://[www.ideasforindia.in/topics/poverty-inequality/universal-basic-income-for-india.html.](http://www.ideasforindia.in/topics/poverty-inequality/universal-basic-income-for-india.html)

53 A quasi-universal rate of 75 per cent implied that the top 25 per cent of the population in terms of income was excluded from the UBI program.

54 Economic Division, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, ch. 9, “Universal Basic Income: A Conversation With and Within the Mahatma,” in Economic Survey 2016–2017, January 2017, accessed April 17, 2020, [www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/index.asp.](http://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/index.asp)

55 Khosla, op. cit.

56 SEWA Bharat and UNICEF, A Little More, How Much It Is… Piloting Basic Income Transfers in Madhya Pradesh, India. January 2014, accessed June 30th 2020, <http://sewabharat.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Report-on-Unconditional-Cash-> Transfer-Pilot-Project-in-Madhya-Pradesh.pdf.

57 Ibid.